Two eliminations in two capitals: ideas and implications for the future

By Orna Mizrahi

The surprising elimination of Fuad Shukr (Hajj Mohsin), Nasrallah's right-hand man, after the Majdal Shams disaster, is a very hard and painful blow for Hezbollah.

This once again demonstrates Israel's intelligence and operational capabilities as it selectively attacked in the heart of the Dahiyeh neighborhood, Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut.

This elimination is significant not only because of Shukr's status and importance within the organization, serving as a kind of chief of staff at Nasrallah's side, but also because of his direct responsibility as head of Hezbollah's strategic deployment in the attacks against communities in northern Israel since October 8, and specifically for the murder of 12 Druze children in Majdal Shams.

A few hours later, the elimination of senior Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Political Bureau, during his visit to Tehran (for which Israel has taken no responsibility), further strengthens Israel's sense of capability and courage, but It also contributes to the confusion and embarrassment among the leaders of the “Axis of Resistance,” led by Nasrallah, and the Iranians, who are now forced to react against Israel.

In our experience so far, the elimination of senior officials has not produced changes at the strategic level, and its main benefit comes from the cognitive value associated with it and the short-term consequences on events on the ground.

Elimination in Lebanon will not stop the "war of attrition" that Hezbollah is waging against Israel in the north, but it appears that in the current circumstances, after almost ten months of fighting, it is an appropriate response that allows both sides to avoid a broad war, in which neither of them is interested at the moment.

Consultations are currently taking place in Beirut and Tehran on how to respond.

Before Shukr's elimination, Hezbollah, which was hesitant to admit his death, had already committed to a response equivalent to the results of the Israeli operation and had warned against an attack on Beirut.

Therefore, it can be safely estimated that an unusual reaction is expected, but it appears that due to the relatively limited nature of the Israeli action, Hezbollah's attack will be such that it will allow Israel to "contain" the event.

Much depends on what Israel does, especially in circumstances where at the same time an action by Iran is also possible, since the elimination of Haniyeh took place under the noses of its security forces, as well as the desire of the Houthis. to retaliate against Israel for the attack on the port of Hodeida.

Source: INSS – The Institute for National Security Studies