Cities of Refuge
They are the six cities specially designated as places of refuge for involuntary murderers. In the midst of its discussion of this topic, the Torah describes the situation of accidental murder that requires relocation to a go miklat, and speaks of a case in which the murderer "without seeing him caused some stone to fall on him that could have killed him, and he died, and he was not his enemy, nor did he seek his harm" (Bemidbar 35:23).
The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin (29a) interprets this verse as referring not only to the relationship between the murderer and the victim, but also to the relationship between the judges presiding over the case and the murderer. If a judge is known to have feelings of personal animosity toward the accused, he must recuse himself from the case. Given the difficulty he would have in maintaining objectivity, he is not permitted to preside over the case and honestly evaluate the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In a sense, we are all "judges" and form views and opinions about other people and their actions. This halacha reminds us of the difficulty we have in maintaining objectivity when harboring predisposed negative feelings toward someone. When someone has wronged us in the past or has aspects of their character that we dislike, we are much more likely to judge that person's actions unfavorably and less likely to give them the benefit of the doubt. We need to be attuned to our own biases and predispositions, and know when to “recuse ourselves” and avoid passing judgment when we cannot honestly maintain strict impartiality. Curiously, we find only several verses later the precise and opposite warning. The section of arei miklat It concludes with the command not to accept a bribe from a murderer seeking exemption from relocating to a city of refuge, and the Torah then adds: "Veló tajanifu et haaretz«: «And you will not defile the land where you are; for this blood will defile the earth, and the earth will not be atoned for by the blood that was shed on it, but by the blood of him who shed it” (Ibid. 35:33). The Sifrei interprets this as a prohibition against chanufah – flattery, and the Ramban explains that just as a court may not accept a bribe to absolve a murderer of responsibility, similarly, a court cannot acquit a murderer because of their impressive achievements or noble lineage. According to Sifrei's reading of this verse, the Torah warns against "flattering" distinguished or respected people in the sense of unjustly absolving them. Even if we have good reasons to like and respect a person, this does not absolve us of the responsibility to act when that person behaves in an immoral or dangerous way.
The law of chanufah warns of how our positive disposition toward a person can cloud our judgment and cause us to justify unlawful behavior that justifies a forceful response. Along with the aforementioned rule requiring a judge to recuse himself from a case involving a defendant he does not like, these halachot remind us of the need to separate our personal feelings toward people from our evaluation of their conduct, to ensure that that we do not condemn every action. Done by someone we don't like, or we approve of every action done by someone we like.
Let us remember that the Torah commands six cities of refuge.arey miklat«, in which people who have committed murder unintentionally can go and avoid being the object of blood revenge (Shemot 20: 12– 14; Bemidbar 35: 9-28; Devarim 4: 41-43, 19: 1- 13; Yehoshua 20; 1 Divrey Hayamim 6). This practice has been described as refuge, asylum, and sanctuary, and cities have been given all three labels, resulting in different understandings of the intent of these cities. The basic legal problem is the distinction between intentional and unintentional homicide. For most ancient Near Eastern societies, including ancient Israel, the idea of "blood revenge" was how the murder of a member of one's clan or family was avenged (Shemot 21:23). The distinction made in association with cities of refuge/asylum was how to deal with an individual who accidentally, unintentionally, killed another (Shemot 21:12-14; Bemidbar 35:16-28). Also associated with this idea is the nature of sanctuary or asylum that can be obtained when one arrives at a cult center with an altar (1 Melachim 1:50–53; 2:23–24).
Unfortunately, blood revenge continues to be carried out today in certain Levantine societies, also under the title of punishing breaches of honor and in mafia organizations. Perhaps if cities of refuge were created again – not only to protect the politically persecuted as happens today, but to protect the murderers who committed the crime without intending to and did not even know the victims – the vicious circle of so many crimes.