By Boaz Shapira
A few days ago, an agreement was signed between the new Syrian regime and the Kurdish forces (SDF), aimed at integrating the latter into the state and its mechanisms.
Furthermore, reports have emerged in the past 24 hours that the regime is conducting advanced negotiations on a similar agreement with Druze leaders.
These agreements are part of [President Ahmed] al Sharaa's effort to unite Syria under a central government and to advance the country's rehabilitation processes.
The agreement between the new regime and Kurdish forces was signed between Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abadi, commander of the SDF, on March 10 in Damascus. Various reports indicate that the agreement was reached through US mediation and pressure. It is unclear whether this pressure is related to Trump's declaration of his plan to withdraw US forces from Syria and hints about the possibility of broader US diplomatic action in the Middle East.
The agreement emphasizes that the Kurds are part of the Syrian people and country, regulating their integration into it.
Among other things, it was agreed that Kurdish civilian institutions would be integrated into those of the new regime and that SDF forces would be integrated into the new army and security organizations. Also agreed upon was Kurdish representation in the political system and state institutions and the return of refugees to the areas from which they were displaced under the regime's protection.
Furthermore, it was noted that control of border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields will be subject to government control, but the SDF spokesperson clarified that at this stage there will be no changes regarding control of energy infrastructure and that regime forces will be deployed only on the borders with Iraq and Türkiye.
The clauses of the agreement must be implemented within one year from the date of its signing.
As mentioned, alongside the signing of the agreement with the Kurds, numerous reports in the past 24 hours claimed that al-Sharaa is conducting advanced negotiations toward an agreement with the Druze as well, but at this stage there is no official information on the matter. Reports suggest that the agreement will supposedly be similar to the one reached with the Kurds and, within its framework, various government ministries will once again operate in Suwayda and the regime's security organizations will be able to deploy and operate throughout the district. Furthermore, it appears that the Druze armed organizations will be subordinated to and integrated into the security organizations, but at this stage it is unclear in what form.
The signing of these agreements (if an agreement is actually signed with the Druze) is a significant success for the new regime. First, it neutralizes two major centers of opposition that had the potential to destabilize the government. Second, it integrates them into the Syrian rehabilitation and reconstruction processes, thus further contributing to the regime's legitimacy. It is also worth noting that the SDF controls a large geographical area that includes oil and gas infrastructure, and that control of this area will also allow for closer monitoring of the border with Iraq and Turkey. The agreement also neutralizes, for now, Kurdish separatist aspirations.
For the Kurds, the agreement could be a way to reduce pressure from Türkiye, which seeks to distance the Kurds from their border areas and limit their activity.
The signing of the agreement with the Druze, if it occurs, is also significant, as they have been one of the most powerful forces in Syria over the years. The consent of Suwayda's spiritual leaders to work alongside the regime could ease tensions not only with the Jabal al-Druze region but also with other Druze concentrations in the country. This measure could also ease tensions with Israel and reassure the West about the new regime's attitude toward minorities (especially in the context of last week's clashes with the Alawites).
However, the signing of the agreement with the Kurds also raises a number of questions. First, the agreement as presented is very general. It does not contain in-depth details on any of the clauses and is primarily declarative. Thus, for example, it does not mention what the status of the Kurds in the country will be or whether their political and social structure and autonomy will be preserved. The agreement also does not address which areas refugees and displaced persons will be allowed to return to, or whether they include the territories that Turkey and the forces of the self-proclaimed SNA [Syrian National Army] have seized in northern Syria. Furthermore, it is unclear how the profits from the exploitation of the gas and oil fields in this area will be distributed.
Second, Türkiye's position on the agreement remains unclear, as is its involvement in drafting it, if any.
Furthermore, although the agreement stipulates that the state will provide protection to displaced persons, it is unclear whether this is coordinated with Turkey and SNA forces and whether al-Sharaa will act against them if they fail to respect the agreement.
Another important issue, not directly related to the agreement but related to the events in Syria, concerns the US presence in the country and relations with Israel. As mentioned, there are indications that the United States intends to withdraw its forces from Syria, and this requires a reassessment of the US position regarding the Kurds and the new regime in Syria, as well as its ability to influence them after their departure.
Regarding Israel, and despite the tension and the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) operations in Syria, it is clear that there is also some dialogue with the new regime. This is evident in the intention to allow Druze workers to work in Israel, as well as in the plan to allow 100 Syrian Druze sheikhs to visit Israel.
Finally, despite the optimism conveyed by the Al Sharaa regime regarding the stabilization and rehabilitation of the country, it must be remembered that the situation in Syria remains unstable. Al Sharaa has yet to reach agreements with the SNA in the north of the country or with the leaders of the 8th Brigade in the south. Furthermore, despite declarations about the defeat of the remnants of the Assad regime, there are still quite a few local organizations of supporters of the former regime in Syria, and they are likely to continue operating for the foreseeable future. Added to this is the fact that Al Sharaa maintains a relatively moderate and pragmatic stance compared to other factions in Syria, and it is uncertain whether they will cooperate with it regarding women's and minority rights, Syria's rapprochement with the West, etc. Another issue concerns sectarian tensions in Syria. As seen last week, these conflicts are not expected to abate anytime soon and are likely to be a major factor shaping intersectarian, interreligious, and political relations in Syria, especially in the context of multi-state intervention in the country.
Source: Alma – Research and Education Center