Hamas's plan to turn Gaza into another Lebanon

By Yaakov Lappin

Hamas seeks to end the war while maintaining its military control over Gaza, mirroring the dominance exercised by Hezbollah.lah before the war in Lebanon. Israel must not allow this to happen, even if Egypt pressures it to do so.

Hamas's primary objective at this point is to secure a ceasefire to survive the war, rebuild its terrorist army, and consolidate its political control of the Gaza Strip.

To achieve this, it has expressed its willingness to create a governance model in Gaza similar to the control Hezbollah exercised in Lebanon before the war: an internationally recognized government that provides a facade of authority, while Hamas retains full military-terrorist control on the ground and de facto political power.

This would allow the jihadist organization to regroup, rearm, and ultimately restart its war against Israel at a time of its choosing, with the added ability to boast to the Palestinians that it was able to carry out the worst mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust and live to see it through.

All the proposals that have emerged in the region—Egypt's, which suggests the Palestinian Authority take political control through a government of technocrats; as well as the ideas that have circulated, even in Israel, of a Gaza governed by a regional coalition—would lead to a dangerous situation similar to that in Lebanon. This is because Israel has not yet completed its military campaign against Hamas.

On March 4, during a summit in Cairo held to present an Arab alternative to President Trump's plan for Gaza, Egyptian President Fateh el-Sisi declared: "Egypt opposes the eviction of Palestinians and supports their right to remain in their land. We will not participate in these plans. Egypt supports the continuation of the ceasefire and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Egypt supports the creation of an administrative committee based on independent technocrats that will temporarily manage the Strip and oversee aid until the return of the Palestinian Authority."

According to a report by Reuters As of March 3, Egypt has drawn up a roadmap for Gaza that proposes "an interim government of a coalition of Arab, Muslim, and Western states." The plan offers no details on how Hamas will be marginalized, who will pay for Gaza's reconstruction, or how governance will be structured.

Most notably, Hamas, according to multiple reports, has already stated that it accepts such agreements. This is a clear indication that the terrorist group sees them as a means to maintain its grip on power.

On February 17, Arab media reported that Hamas had allegedly agreed to transfer control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. Sky News Arabia reported that Hamas made this decision under Egyptian pressure, in the context of negotiations over a ceasefire and hostage settlement with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's spokesman, Omer Dostri, rejected the idea outright, writing in X: "It's not going to happen."

Similarly, Anadolu Agency reported on December 5, 2024, that Hamas had “accepted an Egyptian proposal to form a joint Palestinian committee to govern the Gaza Strip after the ongoing Israeli war.” Hamas claimed it had held talks with Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and other Palestinian terrorist factions to discuss the “implementation of previously agreed-upon frameworks for achieving Palestinian unity.”

Despite these vague formulations, the underlying reality is that Hamas has no intention of relinquishing its control over Gaza, and it will obviously waste no time exploiting the shadow administrations in Gaza to reassert control and entrench itself militarily once again.

The Hezbollah model: A trap that Israel cannot allow

The model for Gaza that Hamas appears poised to adopt is directly inspired by Hezbollah's previous status in Lebanon, where the terrorist group maintained absolute military control despite the existence of a nominally sovereign Lebanese government.

Before the current war, Hezbollah dictated Lebanon's security policy, enjoyed de facto veto power over Lebanese government decisions, operated a shadow state for its Shia Lebanese base, and was the most powerful military force in the country by a wide margin, eclipsing the Lebanese Armed Forces, which it infiltrated through its Shia officers and soldiers.

Despite the existence of a Lebanese government, Hezbollah operated its own military command structure and stockpiled monstrous quantities of weapons with Iranian backing, all while the Lebanese government served as an impotent front for international legitimacy.

This agreement ultimately failed when Hezbollah's presence in Lebanon was crushed by Israel in a war that crippled its infrastructure and territorial control. Today, the Lebanese government is showing the first signs of real sovereignty, confiscating terrorist-funded money flowing through Beirut airport and banning suspicious Iranian flights. There is still a long way to go.

Hamas is likely to attempt to replicate Hezbollah's former structure in Gaza. If successful, this would allow it to rebuild its military capabilities while simultaneously keeping Israel diplomatically restrained from taking decisive action.

Any Israeli attempt to neutralize Hamas in such a scenario would provoke international protests for violating the sovereignty of Gaza's "recognized governing authority," even if that authority had no real power. Any international peacekeeping force would suffer the same fate as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Lebanon and be reduced to a toothless observer used by terrorists as human shields in exchanges of fire with Israel.

The consequences of such an outcome would be disastrous. Hamas would use the time gained by the ceasefire to rearm with weapons from Iran, smuggle in military technology, and likely begin rebuilding its tunnel and rocket system. Under the cover of an internationally approved governing body, Hamas could enhance its military capabilities with impunity. This is precisely what Hezbollah did in Lebanon, amassing a vast arsenal while using the Lebanese government as a shield against Israeli action.

As a result, the only viable path forward is for Israel, sooner or later, to return to combat in Gaza, hold the territory this time, and gain full military and political control over the Strip for at least several months. This is necessary to ensure:

1. The total destruction of the Hamas military and political regimeWithout completely dismantling Hamas's command structure, leadership, and armed forces, any governing arrangement will be meaningless. As long as Hamas retains its weapons and operational capability, it will be the de facto ruler of Gaza, and the people of Gaza will never cooperate with any post-Hamas vision.

2. A long-term Israeli security presence with full operational freedom – Any future governance agreement must allow Israel to conduct counterterrorism operations inside Gaza anywhere, anytime, without restrictions. This means full security oversight, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will retain the ability to attack Hamas remnants from land, air, and sea, as well as prevent the group from rearming. Gaza must become a version of Area A in Judea and Samaria, where the Israel Defense Forces operate nightly to prevent Iran and Hamas from building a terrorist army that threatens central Israel.

Only after these conditions are met can moderate autonomy—backed by the Gulf states and the United States—be considered a possible governing structure for Gaza. Even so, Israel must retain full freedom of operation in security matters to prevent any resurgence of terrorism.

Source: BESA – Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies – Bar-Ilan University